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IS THERE EVIDENCE OF ANTITRUST HARM IN THE 
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE’S HOT DOCS? 
By Sarah Oh1 
The House Judiciary Committee released a large number of 
business documents on July 29, 2020 alongside the Antitrust 
Subcommittee’s hearing on “Online Platforms and Market Power.”2 
The hearing featured the chief executive officers of four large U.S. 
technology companies. Jeff Bezos of Amazon, Sudhar Pichai of Google, 
Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook, and Tim Cook of Apple gave testimony 
and answered questions on a range of topics over five hours.3 The 
business documents are a subset of the documents collected from an 
 
1 Senior Fellow, Technology Policy Institute, 409 12th Street SW, Suite 700, 
Washington, D.C. 20024. Ph.D., Economics, George Mason University, J.D., 
Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, B.S., 
Management Science & Engineering, Stanford University. The views 
expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of 
TPI’s staff, board of directors, or board of academic advisors. Thanks to 
Jeffrey Propp for summer research assistance and document review. 
2 Video of hearing on Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 6: 
Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google, H. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COMM., AND ADMIN. 
LAW, 116TH CONG. 2 (July 29, 2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=3113 
[hereinafter Hearing Video]. 
3 See, e.g., Ryan Tracy, Big Tech’s Power Comes under Fire at Congressional 
Antitrust Hearing, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-ceos-defend-operations-ahead-of-
congressional-hearing-11596027626; Antitrust Hearing Targets Big Tech—
Live Analysis, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/https-www-wsj-com-livecoverage-tech-
ceos-hearing-2020. 
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ongoing antitrust investigation by the House Committee.4 We read the 
files and analyze them below. In my assessment, these “hot docs,” 
particularly combined with market evidence, reveal episodes of rapid 
growth and innovation in digital markets, as opposed to obvious 




















4 Hearing on Online Platforms and Market Power: Examining the Dominance 
of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Comm., and Admin. Law, 116th Cong. 2 
(2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/online-platforms-and-market-power 
[hereinafter Hearing Documents].  
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INTRODUCTION 
In conjunction with a public hearing on July 29, 2020, the 
House Judiciary Committee released a set of business documents from 
several large U.S. technology firms as evidence of anticompetitive 
conduct and antitrust injury.5 In my assessment, these “hot docs,” 
particularly combined with market evidence, reveal episodes of rapid 
growth and innovation in digital markets, as opposed to obvious 
instances of anticompetitive conduct.6 These documents will not be the 
only evidence prosecutors will bring in litigation, however, and far 
more hard evidence and analysis of economic conduct will be needed 
to prove antitrust injury.7  
I. AMAZON 
The Amazon documents focused on how the company 
competed with Quidsi, the parent company of Diapers.com and 
 
5 Hearing Video, supra note 2 (opening statement of the Chairman of 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the 
Committee of the Judiciary, David Cicilline, Representative, Rhode Island at 
00:00:32, describing the bipartisan requests for information on September 
2019 from the four firms, receiving millions of pages of documents from the 
firms, documents and submissions from hundreds of market participants, 
hundreds of hours of interviews, and five Congressional hearings, seventeen 
briefings and roundtables with over 35 experts and stakeholders). After six 
hearings, the majority staff of the subcommittee released a final report, see 
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION ON 
COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS (2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pd
f. 
6 For a discussion of the difference between business rhetoric and economic 
conduct in antitrust litigation, see generally Geoffrey A. Manne & E. 
Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold Economics: The Use and Misuse of 
Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 609 (2005). 
7 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST 
DIVISION MANUAL ch.3 (5th ed. 2021), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761141/download; see generally Hearing 
Video, supra note 2 (opening statement of the Ranking Member, James 
Sensenbrenner, Representative, Wisconsin at 00:09:03, describing the 
increased scrutiny on big technology firms with the caveat that “being big is 
not inherently bad, quite the opposite, in America you should be rewarded 
for success.”). 
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Soap.com, the company’s acquisitions of Blink and Ring, and its rules 
and behavior with respect to third-party sellers.8  
In all of these instances, whether Amazon has acted 
anticompetitively will depend heavily on how a court agrees to define 
relevant markets at the time of the acquisitions.9 Today, at the very 
highest level is a debate about Amazon’s position as a retailer.10 On 
one hand, Amazon accounts for almost fifty percent of U.S. retail 
ecommerce sales.11 On the other hand, online retail sales account for 
only sixteen percent of all U.S. retail sales, which means Amazon 
accounts for at most, eight percent of all U.S. retail sales.12 For each 
more narrowly defined product, a court would have to begin by 
deciding whether the relevant market is online sales only or all retail 
 
8 Amazon documents from the Hearing on Online Platforms and Market 
Power: Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Comm., and 
Admin. Law, 116th Cong. 2 (2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/online-
platforms-and-market-power/#1 [hereinafter Hearing Documents (Amazon)]. 
9 See generally Monopolization Defined, FED. TRADE COMM’N: GUIDE TO 
ANTITRUST LAWS: SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-
conduct/monopolization-defined (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
10 Hearing Video, supra note 2 (statement of David Cicilline, Representative, 
Rhode Island at 00:04:28, on the question of market dominance of the four 
technology firms that motivates the subcommittee’s investigation); id. 
(question by Joe Neguse, Representative, Colorado at 04:04:10 for Jeff Bezos 
about Amazon’s share of global retail sales and U.S. retail sales). 
11 Hearing Documents (Amazon), supra note 8, at Ex. B, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0006.pdf (citing Top 10 US 
Companies, Ranked by Retail Ecommerce Sales Share, 2020, EMARKETER 
(Feb. 2020), https://www.emarketer.com/chart/233980/top-10-us-companies-
ranked-by-retail-ecommerce-sales-share-2020-of-us-retail-ecommerce-
sales); see also Hearing Video, supra note 2 (question by David Cicilline, 
Representative, Rhode Island at 02:31:20, citing the EMarketer statistic). 
12 U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS: QUARTERLY RETAIL E-
COMMERCE SALES 2 (2020), 
https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf. 
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sales.13 The answer to that question alone has major implications on the 
degree to which Amazon is able to act anticompetitively.14 
A. Diapers.com and Soap.com 
Several analysts contend Amazon’s price competition with 
Diapers.com is an example of anticompetitive conduct.15 During the 
House Judiciary Committee hearing, Representative Mary Gay 
Scanlon (D-PA) said that in 2009, Amazon incurred $200 million in 
profit losses to win market share and followed Diapers.com in raising 
prices months later.16 She cited these facts as evidence of Amazon 
using a predatory pricing strategy to undercut Diapers.com and drive 
them out of business.17 Emails show no doubt that Amazon’s strategy 
was to compete on lower prices.18 
 
13 See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R45910, ANTITRUST 
AND “BIG TECH” at 5 n.30, 31 & 34 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45910.pdf (citing Jonathan Baker, Market 
Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 129 (2007); 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); and U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 
(2010)). 
14 Id. 
15 See generally Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE 
L.J. 710 (2017). 
16 Hearing Video, supra note 2 (question by Mary Gay Scanlon, 
Representative, Pennsylvania at 02:14:00 for Jeff Bezos asking for his 
estimate of how much Amazon was willing to lose to compete with lower 
prices than Diapers.com after describing Amazon emails that outlined a plan 
to temporarily cut prices, referencing Email from Doug Herrington to Jeff 
Bezos, infra note 20); id. (response from Jeff Bezos at 02:16:54 recollecting 
that Amazon invested $350 million into Diapers.com after the acquisition for 
further development of the service). 
17 Hearing Video, supra note 2 (question by Mary Gay Scanlon, 
Representative, Pennsylvania at 02:14:00); id. (response from Jeff Bezos at 
02:16:54). 
18 Email from Doug Herrington, Senior Vice President of North American 
Retail, Amazon, to Tom Furphy, Vice President of AmazonFresh, Amazon, 
Michelle Rothman, Vice President of Amazon Fashion, Amazon, David 
Nenke, Dir. of Marketing and Product for Cloud Drive, Amazon, and Chance 
Wales, Dir. of Worldwide Brand Merchandising and Content, Amazon (Feb. 
9, 2009), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/00151722.pdf). 
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Figure 1. Diapers.com in June 2010 
In 2009, Diapers.com was, in Amazon’s view, its “#1 short 
term competitor” with notable year-over-year revenue growth.19 In 
2010, Soap.com was Amazon’s “most significant short term 
competitor in the [health and personal care] space.”20 In one email, 
Amazon’s product manager wrote, “we need to match pricing on these 
guys no matter what the cost.”21 Amazon’s plan included more than 
just price competition. It also planned to change order cutoff times and 
improve speed on its diaper product pages.22  
In June 2010, Amazon developed a “plan to win,”23 which 
included “market leading prices on diapers,” free Prime offerings, and 
an “Amazon Mom” program.24 The plan was meant to undercut 
Diapers.com and “slow the adoption of soap.com.”25 The Amazon team 
assessed the strategy a few months later in September 2010, remarking 
that Quidsi’s management reported in company documents that “they 
 
19 Id.  
20 Email from Doug Herrington, Senior Vice President of North American 
Retail, Amazon, to Jeff Bezos, Chief Exec. Officer, Amazon, Jeff Wilke, 
Chief Exec. Officer of Consumer Bus., Amazon, Diego Piacentini, Senior 
Vice President of Int’l Consumer Bus., Amazon, Greg Hart, Head of 
Worldwide Video, Amazon and Jeff Blackburn Vice President of Bus. Dev. 
and Dig. Entm’t, Amazon (June 8, 2010), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/00132026.pdf). 
21 Email from Doug Herrington to Tom Furphy, supra note 18.  
22 Id. 
23 Email from Doug Herrington to Jeff Bezos, supra note 20.  
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
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expect to lose lots of money over the next[sic] few years[sic].”26 In a 
company report, Quidsi, the parent company of Diapers.com, reported 
a challenging third quarter of 2010 with decelerating growth in the core 
diapers category.27  
 
Figure 2. Amazon.com in September 2010 
In the hearing, several members of the House Committee 
seemed to believe that these actions were evidence of predatory 
pricing.28 Predatory pricing, however, involves more than a plan to 
undercut rivals’ prices.29 After all, consumers benefit when one 
 
26 Email from Peter Krawiec, Vice President of Worldwide Corporate Dev., 
Amazon, to Jeff Wilke, Chief Exec. Officer of Consumer Bus., Amazon, Doug 
Herrington, Senior Vice President of North American Retail, Amazon, and 
Jeff Blackburn Vice President of Bus. Dev. and Dig. Entm’t, Amazon (Sept. 
21, 2010), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/00009716.pdf.  
27 Hearing Documents (Amazon), supra note 8, at Ex. A, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0004.pdf.  
28 Hearing Video, supra note 2 (statement of Mary Gay Scanlon, 
Representative, Pennsylvania at 02:14:00; statement of Jamie Raskin, 
Representative, Maryland at 02:56:18, asking Jeff Bezos if the Amazon Echo 
was priced below-cost, with response by Jeff Bezos that it is not priced below-
cost at its list price, but on promotion, yes, it may be priced below-cost.). 
29 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
226 (1993) (“Evidence of below-cost pricing is not alone sufficient to permit 
an inference of probable recoupment and injury to competition.”). Historical 
accounts of claims of predatory pricing has been questioned even in 
retrospectives of Standard Oil v. New Jersey, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See, e.g., 
John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. 
& ECON. 137-69, 137 (1958) (re-examining whether or not the facts in 
Standard Oil actually revealed predatory price cutting).  
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competitor undercuts another’s prices.30 Under a predatory pricing 
strategy, a firm uses below-cost pricing to corner a market with the 
intention of increasing prices after competitors have exited.31 A 
strategy of aggressive price-matching and a “plan to win” may allude 
to the specter of anticompetitive conduct but does not prove the case.32 
On their own, the emails do little to establish whether the company 
acted in an injurious way.33 
To prove that Amazon engaged in predatory pricing, plaintiffs 
must, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, prove that, “(1) the 
prices were below an appropriate measure of defendant's costs in the 
short term, and (2) defendant had a dangerous probability of recouping 
its investment in below-cost prices.”34 These principles were 
established in the 1993 Supreme Court decision, Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.35 In that case, the Court 
 
30 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226 (“[T]he mechanism by which a firm engages 
in predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the same mechanism by which a 
firm stimulates competition; because ‘cutting prices in order to increase 
business often is the very essence of competition … [;] mistaken inferences 
… are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws 
are designed to protect.’”). 
31 Id. at 225 (“The plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a likelihood that the 
predatory scheme alleged would cause a rise in prices above a competitive 
level that would be sufficient to compensate for the amounts expended on the 
predation, including the time value of the money invested in it.”). 
32 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM 
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT ch. 4 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-
under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-4#N_56 (stating Section 2 
investigations of predatory pricing by the U.S. Department of Justice include 
inquiries into six key issues, “(1) the frequency of predatory pricing, (2) 
treatment of above-cost pricing, (3) cost measures, (4) recoupment, (5) 
potential defenses, and (6) equitable remedies”). 
33 In an antitrust lawsuit, market dominance will need to be proven and cannot 
simply be asserted. But see Khan, supra note 15, at 774 (“Although Amazon 
established its dominance in this market through aggressive price cutting and 
selling steeply at a loss…”). 
34 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM 
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 53 (2008),      
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-
under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-4. 
35 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226.  
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considered economic models, such as game theory, to determine 
whether a rival cigarette manufacturer engaged in predatory pricing.36  
In theory, both above-cost and below-cost pricing can harm 
consumers.37 But in order to interpret a firm’s pricing behavior in the 
context of relevant market structure, an estimate of the firm’s costs 
needs to be established.38 Lower courts have grappled with how to 
define a defendant’s “appropriate measure” of costs in predatory 
pricing cases.39 Ultimately, however, after an investigation of pricing 
and costs, the consumer welfare standard directs antitrust enforcers and 
litigants to prove that price-cutting resulted in harm to consumers.40 
That harm may be in the form of less quantity, lower quality, higher 
prices, or loss of innovation among competitors.41  
 
36 Id. at 230–31 (theory of the case depends on “a complex chain of cause and 
effect”); id. at 226 (citing Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Testing for 
Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible?, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 869 (1989)); see 
generally Donald J. Boudreaux, Kenneth G. Elzinga, & David E. Mills, The 
Supreme Court’s Predation Odyssey: From Fruit Pies to Cigarettes, 4 
SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 57-93 (1995). 
37 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 230–31. 
38 Id. at 222–24 (“First, a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury 
resulting from a rival’s low prices must prove that the prices complained of 
are below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs . . . The second 
prerequisite to holding a competitor liable under the antitrust laws for charging 
low prices is a demonstration that the competitor had a reasonable prospect, 
or under §2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its 
investment in below-cost prices . . . Recoupment is the ultimate object of an 
unlawful predatory pricing scheme, it is the means by which a predator profits 
from predation.”). 
39 Id. at 222 n.1 (parties agreed to “average variable cost” as the appropriate 
measure of cost allowing the court in this case to avoid the question posed by 
lower courts on how to select the appropriate measure of cost in a predatory 
pricing case). 
40 Id. at 224 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 
(1962)) (“It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection 
of competition, not competitors.’”) (emphasis in original); see also, Hearing 
Video, supra note 2 (opening statement of the Ranking Member, James 
Sensenbrenner, Representative, Wisconsin at 00:10:37, stating that “antitrust 
law and the consumer welfare standard have served the country well for over 
a century,” but emphasizes the need to “ensure established antitrust laws are 
applied to meet needs of the country and its consumers;” and questions for Jeff 
Bezos and Sudhar Pichai at 02:40:25, on efficiency losses and higher prices 
for consumers from a hypothetical breakup of one-stop shopping).  
41 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 233 (discussing evidence of restricted output 
from increased prices, not finding a reasonable inference from price or output 
data). 
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Investigators might question the effect of the Diapers.com 
acquisition on innovation.42 In this case, the acquisition appears to have 
generated new innovation and entry.43 The $545 million acquisition 
resulted in payouts to two founders, one of whom went on to build 
Jet.com, which he later sold to Walmart for $3.3 billion.44 An antitrust 
analysis of innovation in 2009–2010 may need to take into account the 
incentives of serial entrepreneurs in those years of online retail 
markets.45 Without a payout from an earlier acquisition, would this 
founder have had the resources or track record to create another 
successful technology company?46 Incentives for entrepreneurial 
activity should be balanced against loss of innovation from acquisitions 
in an antitrust analysis of this sort.47   
B. The Blink and Ring Acquisitions 
The key issue surrounding Amazon’s acquisitions of Blink and 
Ring is whether the acquisitions injured nascent or potential 
competitors.48 The emails show that Blink and Ring executives held 
meetings to discuss possible merger and acquisition opportunities with 
 
42 See generally Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Policy and 
Innovation: Must Enforcement Change to Account for Technological 
Change?, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (eds. Adam B. Jaffe, 
Josh Lerner, & Scott Stern) (MIT Press, 2005), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c10809/c10809.pdf. 
43 Thomas W. Hazlett, The New Trustbusters Are Coming for Big Tech, 
REASON MAGAZINE (Sept. 5, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/09/05/the-new-
trustbusters-are-coming-for-big-tech (noting subsequent entrepreneurial 
activity by the founders of the acquired firm, “All these monopolies, so many 
startups.”). 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; see also Joseph J. Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared 
Remarks at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum 2020 (Nov. 12, 
2020), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1583022/sim
ons_-_remarks_at_antitrust_law_fall_forum_2020.pdf (“Large firms often 
acquire small firms, and the payout associated with the acquisition may 
incentivize individuals and small firms to engage in costly and risky 
innovation in the first place. If the law prohibits all acquisitions of this type, 
then we might expect a lower amount of such innovation.”). 
46 Hazlett, supra note 43. 
47 Id. 
48 See generally John Yun, Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and 
Killer Acquisitions, in THE GLOBAL ANTITRUST INSTITUTE REPORT ON THE 
DIGITAL ECONOMY 18 (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3733716.  
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Amazon.49 As Amazon moved forward with its due diligence on the 
Ring acquisition, executives stated that the company was “willing to 
pay for market position as it’s hard to catch the leader.”50 The emails 
reveal internal deliberations about the process of absorbing Ring and 
how difficult it would be to replicate their technology.51 Jeff Bezos 
noted his view that Amazon was “buying market position – not 
technology. And that market position and momentum is very 
valuable.”52 
The Bezos comment appears to show that the company bought 
Ring in order to enter the home security market with an established 
brand.53 But rhetoric alone does little to prove or disprove that an 
acquisition was anticompetitive. To show that the acquisitions of Blink 
or Ring were anticompetitive, prosecutors need a far more extensive 
economic record.54 It should include, for example, an attempt to define 
the relevant market and data outlining the relevant market.55 With that 
information, analysts can begin examining the economic effects of 
post-acquisition product integration.56 An analysis should examine 
whether Amazon squashed a potential competitor or improved a 
fledgling product and its distribution.57 
 
49 Email from Allen Parker, Vice President of Finance, World-wide 
Operations and Customer, Service, Amazon, to Brian Olsavsky, Chief 




52 Email from Jeff Bezos, Chief Exec. Officer, Amazon, to Dave Limp, Vice 
President, Kindle, Amazon (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/00173560.pdf). 
53 Id. 
54 See generally Competitive Effects, FED. TRADE COMM’N: GUIDE TO 
ANTITRUST LAWS: MERGERS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-




57 Id.; see also Entry and Efficiencies, FED. TRADE COMM’N: GUIDE TO 
ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/entry-efficiencies (last visited Mar. 3, 
2021). 
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More importantly, the analysis must address how consumers 
have been affected by Amazon’s acquisition.58 In 2019, Consumer 
Reports rated Ring as the second-best DIY home security system, just 
behind Google’s Nest brand.59 The higher tier of Ring’s professional 
monitoring plan is $10 per month or $100 per year.60 The leading home 
security company, ADT, has monitoring plans “starting at $28.99 per 
month.”61 There is little doubt that consumers are better off now than 
they were before Ring was on the market.62 The question will be 
whether it could have achieved its current success without Amazon or 
a similarly large owner. 
It is those and other related questions that the Federal Trade 
Commission is in the process of investigating currently.63 In February 
2020, the FTC issued special orders to the five biggest tech firms to 
collect information about acquisitions that did not meet threshold 
reporting requirements.64 The FTC stated that its inquiry will include a 
 
58 Competitive Effects, supra note 54; see also The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (“Yet for 
over 100 years, the antitrust laws have had the same basic objective: to protect 
the process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there are 
strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and 
keep quality up.”). 
59 Home Security Systems, CONSUMER REPORTS, 
https://www.consumerreports.org/products/home-security-systems-
200196/diy-home-security-systems-200197/recommended/ (last visited Feb. 
9, 2021).  
60 Protect Plans, RING, https://shop.ring.com/pages/protect-plans (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2021). 
61 Compare Our Home Security Systems, ADT, https://www.adt.com/compare 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
62 See generally Michael Brown, Ring Alarm, Product Review, 25 
MACWORLD 38 (Aug. 2018) (introducing the new app and home security 
system, “Ring Alarm is positioned as a mainstream home security system, and 
it's already equipped with everything it needs to grow into a comprehensive 
smart home system.”). 
63 FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions by Large Technology Companies, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N: PRESS RELEASES (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-examine-past-
acquisitions-large-technology-companies (special orders approved by a 5-0 
commission vote with authority to conduct a 6(b) study under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2018), with reference to its 
implementation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 
1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2018)). 
64 Id. 
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study of trends in acquisitions, structure of deals, and post-acquisition 
product development, pricing, and integration.65 This investigation 
should yield information far more informative than emails about the 
competitive implications of the acquisitions.66 
C. Suppliers and Third-Party Sellers 
Certain emails shed some light on how Amazon interacts with 
suppliers.67 Amazon developed “supplier tenets” that described its own 
prices compared to supplier prices.68 “We must have equal or better 
prices . . . all the selection . . . and fast track offers on selection offered 
by SIC and IC competitors.”69 Under these rules, in the event that 
customers had access to better prices or selection on another website, 
Amazon could choose to “force the supplier to either lower the price, 
provide the selection or enter the Amazon Reseller program.”70 
An anecdote from a small bookseller on its experiences dealing 
with Amazon and Amazon’s marketplace platform was included in the 
House Committee exhibits.71 The bookseller claims that Amazon’s 
growing market share was eliminating business opportunities.72 One 
presentation slide includes the bookseller’s plea to Amazon, affirming      
 
65 Id.      
66 See generally CHRISTINE S. WILSON & ROHIT CHOPRA, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, STATEMENT CONCERNING NON-REPORTABLE HART-SCOTT-




pdf; Kadhim Shubber, Big Tech Ordered to Reveal Details of Smaller Deals, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 11, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/e56d2820-4cef-
11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5; John D. McKinnon & Deepa Seetharaman, FTC 
Expands Antitrust Investigation Into Big Tech, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-plans-to-examine-past-acquisitions-by-big-
tech-companies-11581440270.  
67 Email from Doug Herrington, Senior Vice President of North American 
Retail, Amazon, to Jeff Wilke, Chief Exec. Officer, Consumer Bus., Amazon 
and Sebastian Gunningham, Senior Vice President of Amazon Marketplace, 





71 Hearing Documents (Amazon), supra note 8, at Ex. B, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0006.pdf. 
72 Id. 
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its compliance to Amazon’s standards and begging Amazon to not      
squash its business.73  
 
Figure 3. Third-Party Seller Quote in House Judiciary Committee 
Documents 
It is difficult not to feel concern for the plight of the seller. But 
antitrust laws are intended to protect consumers, not businesses, and 
the relevant question is how consumers fare under Amazon’s 
marketplace rules and Amazon’s behavior.74 The documents provide 
no evidence one way or another on this key question.75  
 
73 Id. 
74 Several members of Congress focused on alleged harms to small sellers, as 
reported in Dana Mattioli, Amazon Scooped Up Data From Its Own Sellers to 
Launch Competing Products, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-scooped-up-data-from-its-own-sellers-
to-launch-competing-products-11587650015; see Hearing Video, supra note 
2 (question by Pramila Jayapal, Representative, Washington at 01:51:00, for 
Jeff Bezos asking how Amazon uses data to compete with third-party sellers); 
id. (question by Lucy McBath, Representative, Georgia at 02:25:35, to Jeff 
Bezos); id. (question by David Cicilline, Representative, Rhode Island at 
02:31:31, to Jeff Bezos); id. (question by Kelly Armstrong, Representative, 
North Dakota, at 03:43:00 for Jeff Bezos on use of aggregate data on third-
party sellers in the development of Amazon’s private label products); id. 
(question by Joe Neguse, Representative, Colorado at 04:06:11 for Jeff Bezos 
on Amazon’s use of data on users of AWS). 
75 Hearing Video, supra note 2 (response by Jeff Bezos to Pramila Jayapal, 
Representative, Washington, at 01:56:00, regarding Amazon’s treatment of 
third-party sellers: “I’m very proud of what we’ve done for third-party sellers 
on our platform.”). 
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II. APPLE 
The Apple documents focus on the company’s App Store 
policies and procedures.76 Specifically, the documents reveal the inner 
workings of the App Store’s app review process, changes to parental 
control apps, treatment of native apps, and rules on in-app purchases 
(IAP).77  
A. Search Results and App Review in the App Store 
Many of the documents involve complaints from app 
developers to Apple. App developers emailed the company seeking 
help with placement in the App Store because their apps were “virtually 
invisible”78 on the store’s directory. One developer alleged that the 
search algorithm on the App Store appeared to rely on top-25 lists 
rather than keywords, unfairly making some apps difficult to find.79 
Another developer complained that users searching for an exact match 
or variations of their app’s name could not find their app in the first 
100 results of the App Store. One developer said, “we simply cannot 
succeed if we can't be searched on your store. This is sad for us, but 
also sad for the iOS ecosystem.”80 
Another developer complained of the app review process to get 
an app to be distributed in the App Store.81 The developer spent money 
redesigning an app to comply with standards after its sudden removal 
 
76 Apple documents from the Hearing on Online Platforms and Market 
Power: Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary Hearing Documents, 116th Cong. 2 
(2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/online-platforms-and-market-power/#2 
[hereinafter Hearing Documents (Apple)]. 
77 Id. 
78 Email from Tim Cook, Chief Exec. Officer, Apple, Inc. to Eddy Cue, Senior 
Vice President of Internet Software and Services, Apple Inc. and Philip 
Schiller, Apple Fellow, Apple Inc. (Oct. 10, 2012), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/007767.pdf. 
79 Email from Eddy Cue, Senior Vice President of Internet Software and 
Services, Apple Inc., to Patrice Gautier, Vice President Eng’g, Apple Inc. 
(Aug. 26, 2010), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/007673.pdf.  
80 Email from Confidential to Confidential (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/008115.pdf.  
81 Email from Tim Cook, Chief Exec. Officer, Apple Inc., to Eddy Cue, Senior 
Vice President of Internet Software and Services, Apple Inc., Phil Schiller, 
Apple Fellow, Apple Inc., and Craig Federighi, Senior Vice President of 
Software Eng’g, Apple Inc. (Jan. 25, 2015), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/015127.pdf. 
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from the App Store, only to be met with more rejection.82 The 
developer was frustrated by the app review process, saying that even if 
he were to design an app “in a way that we believe to be in the spirit of 
Apple and try to make sure we do it as Apple would want, we could 
still get whacked. We are now scared of Apple.”83  
Much like the story from the bookseller discussed above, it is 
difficult to read these emails and not feel frustrated on behalf of the 
petitioning developers. Still, the key question is whether Apple uses the 
App Store to systematically foreclose competition or engage in unfair 
or deceptive practices using quality control as an excuse. This question 
cannot be answered by claims of a few developers, whose particular 
apps may have been technically deficient, failed to meet some security 
standard, or whose apps were unfortunately harmed by legitimate 
changes in the App Store.84 By the same token, Apple cannot disprove 
foreclosure by explaining why any given developer in question is 
wrong. 
Instead, to evaluate foreclosure, an investigation must begin 
with an understanding of the business structure of app stores and 
definition of the relevant markets.85 A few of these questions were 
raised in Apple Inc. v. Pepper,86 and will continue to be crucial.  
In the oral arguments of Apple Inc. v. Pepper, Justice Breyer 
asked whether Apple’s App Store was different from any other type of 
distribution company.87 He expressed skepticism about new economic 
theories of two-sided markets.88 On the other hand, Justice Sotomayor 
reasoned that an App Store is not like vertically integrated brick 
suppliers, but that the app ecosystem is a “closed-loop” with Apple 




84 For an analysis of the economics of app stores, see generally Sarah Oh & 
Scott Wallsten, The Law and Economics of Apple Inc. v. Pepper, TECH. POL’Y 
INST. (Dec. 20, 2018), https://techpolicyinstitute.org/2018/12/20/the-law-and-
economics-of-apple-inc-v-pepper. 
85 Id. 
86 Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1516 (2019).  
87 Id.; Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 
1514 (2019) (No. 17-204), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/1
7-204_32q3.pdf. 
88 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 
(2019) (No. 17-204). 
89 Id. at 6. 
210  SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 37 
to a claim of foreclosure, and an antitrust investigation would need to 
tackle these questions on two-sided markets once again.90 
B. Native Apps 
The documents also include rhetoric around Apple’s pre-
loading onto iPhones native apps such as Apple Music, Apple Mail, 
and Apple Maps.91 The company discourages copycat apps, but retains 
the right to distribute its own native apps even if they perform similar 
functions as an existing third-party app.92  
In one document, employees discussed how rebuttals to 
monopolistic charges around native apps should not focus on App 
Store choices and review processes, but rather on market share, job 
creation, and competition among different apps.93 One employee 
wrote, “The reason our services aren’t on the app store is because of 
the native apps. I think we’re better served looking at the success of 
developers and the thriving businesses it’s created.”94 Apple noted that 
at one point in time, native apps represented approximately 311 of 2 
million total apps (0.0001%) in the App Store, and that the company 
“does not subordinate the exposure of 3rd party apps.”95  
Several other high-profile antitrust cases have raised questions 
about whether companies can bundle their own native apps without 
running afoul of competition concerns.96 Determining whether Apple 
behaved anticompetitively with its native apps and pre-loaded defaults 
will involve considerations such as the difficulty of downloading and 
installing replacements for the pre-loaded defaults, the level of 
integration of the native apps with the operating system, and other 
effects on innovation in the app ecosystem.97  
 
90 See Oh & Wallsten, supra note 84. 
91 Hearing Documents (Apple), supra note 76. 
92 Hearing Documents (Apple), supra note 76, at Ex. C, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0010.pdf. 
93 E-mail from Kristin Huguet, Spokeswoman, Apple Inc., to Steve Dowling, 




96 Self-preferencing in bundled products has been investigated in other 
antitrust litigation, most notably in U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
97 The European Commission completed its investigation of the pre-loaded 
Google search app on the Google Android operating system in 2018 based on 
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C. In-App Purchases  
A recent set of civil complaints by Epic Games has brought 
controversies about Apple (and Google’s) in-app purchase policies to 
national headlines.98 Internal communications about Apple’s in-app 
purchase policy from 2010-2011 shed light on some motivations 
behind key decisions in the design of the App Store ecosystem.99  
In 2010, an internal email showed how executives made 
decisions about Apple’s in-app payment policy.100 One executive 
began to discuss the implications of changes in the mobile market after 
viewing a YouTube ad that showed mobile users building libraries of 
Kindle books on an iPhone and subsequently switching to an Android 
phone to continue reading the same books.101 The Kindle app was 
allowing iPhone users to buy books directly from Amazon, thus by-
passing Apple’s in-app payment system. In response, Steve Jobs said, 
“I think it’s time to begin applying [our payment mechanism] 
uniformly except for existing subscriptions...”102 
An email between Jobs and Eddy Cue from 2011 showed 
continued development of this policy.103 Cue listed the implications of 
big decisions around in-app purchases in light of competition from 
 
its assessment of market structure in mobile applications. Analysis of Apple’s 
App Store would involve similar considerations. See generally European 
Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google 
€4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to 
Strengthen Dominance of Google's Search Engine (July 18, 2018), 
https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm. 
98 See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC, et 
al., No. 3:20-cv-05671, at 21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020), https://cdn.vox-
cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/21759099/file0.243586135368002.pdf; 
see also Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 
4:20-cv-05640-YGR, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://cdn2.unrealengine.com/apple-complaint-734589783.pdf. 
99 Hearing Documents (Apple), supra note 76. 
100 E-mail from Steve Jobs, Chief Exec. Officer, Apple Inc., to Philip Schiller, 




103 Email from Steve Jobs, Chief Exec. Officer, Apple Inc., to Eddy Cue, 
Senior Vice President of Internet Software and Services, Apple Inc. (Feb. 6, 
2011), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/014816.pdf.  
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Android phones and Amazon books.104 Jobs decided that, “iBooks is 
going to be the only bookstore on iOS devices. We need to hold our 
heads high. One can read books bought elsewhere, just not 
buy/rent/subscribe from iOS without paying us, which we 
acknowledge is prohibitive for many things.”105  
 
Figure 4. Apple App Store in October 2010 
The emails also included discussions on how in-app payment 
fees would apply to other digital goods such as “Netflix, WSJ, MLB, 
Pandora.”106 Cue said, “[t]his is going to be a huge decision for us.”107 
Later that year, the Apple team also discussed how to apply in-app 
payment fees for sports and other media.108 
More recent business documents show how app developers 
seek to dispute Apple’s in-app purchase policy. In 2017, emails show 
that Spotify was in non-compliance with the in-app payments policy in 
the fourth quarter of 2016.109 Spotify changed its app to allow users to 
 
104 Email from Eddy Cue, Senior Vice President of Internet Software & Servs., 
Apple Inc., to Steve Jobs, Chief Exec. Officer, Apple Inc. (Feb. 6, 2011), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/014816.pdf.           
105 Email from Steve Jobs to Eddy Cue, supra note 103. 
106 Email from Eddy Cue to Steve Jobs, supra note 104. 
107 Id. 
108 E-mail from Jai Chulani, Dir. of Worldwide Prod. Mktg: Apple TV & Dig. 
Media Prods., Airport Wi-Fi Prods., Apple Inc., to Eddy Cue, Senior Vice 
President of Internet Software & Servs., Apple Inc. (Mar. 17, 2011),      
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/015059.pdf.      
109 Memorandum from Bruce Sewell, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Apple 
Inc., to Horacio Gutierrez, Gen. Counsel & Sec’y, Spotify USA Inc. (Oct. 28, 
2016), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/013578.pdf. 
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click through to its external website to purchase premium 
subscriptions, a technical feature that violated Apple’s Rule 3.1.1.110 
Apple’s correspondence included reasons for company policy,  
“If a developer chooses not to use in-app purchase, it 
is free to do so. A developer is also free to sell 
traditional content such as music (including via 
subscription) outside of the app and then offer 
consumers a way to access that content from within 
app. What a developer cannot do is seek to use its iOS 
app as a marketing tool to redirect consumers outside 
the app to avoid in-app purchase. This fundamentally 
undermines the App Store business model.”111  
In 2018, T-Mobile’s FamilyMode app also failed to pass the app review 
process due to violations of the in-app purchase policy.112 T-Mobile 
designed its app to connect with T-Mobile’s network infrastructure to 
authenticate users of the network.113 The app, however, allowed users 
to charge payments directly to T-Mobile, working around Apple’s in-
app payment system.114 According to T-Mobile, the payments were in 
compliance with Apple’s in-app purchase policy and essential for 
telephony services such as 911.115 Apple disagreed.116 
Whether Apple’s app review policies are antitrust violations is 
likely to hinge on how the policies affect the relevant market and 
whether prosecutors can prove that the issues raised are bigger than 
disputes between companies over how to distribute profits or protect 
user privacy or security.117 A plaintiff must be able to successfully 
argue not just that they think a 30 percent commission is unfair, but 
that the commission and other App Store policies at issue have harmed 
consumers by, for example, keeping end-user prices higher than they 




112 E-mail from Mike Sievert, President and Chief Operating Officer, T-
Mobile Inc., to Philip Schiller, Senior Vice President of Worldwide Mktg., 




115 Id.      
116 Id. 
117 See Oh & Wallsten, supra note 84. 
118 Id. 
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Similarly, not being able to pay for services like Netflix and Spotify 
within an app are not, by definition, harms.119 To prove harm, a plaintiff 
would have to demonstrate that the inability to make payments through 
the app foreclosed sales, thereby harming consumers.120 
On the other side, Apple will need to prove countervailing 
benefits that might offset any harms.121 For example, Apple argues that 
strict control of the payment system is necessary to prevent fraud and 
protect consumers.122 Apple will need to quantify the benefits of this 
(and other) payment rules if it is to argue that as one reason to maintain 








120 On foreclosure theory in industrial organization and antitrust case law, see 
generally Joshua D. Wright & Alexander Krzepicki, Rethinking Foreclosure 
Analysis in Antitrust Law: From Standard Stations to Google, 
CONCURRENTIALISTE: J. OF ANTITRUST L. (Dec. 17, 2020) (citing Patrick Rey 
& Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION III (eds. Mark Armstrong and Rob Porter) (North Holland, 
2007)), https://leconcurrentialiste.com/wright-krzepicki-foreclosure.  
121 Unilateral effects analysis would include a balancing of countervailing 
benefits against harms. For an explanation of how foreclosure would be 
analyzed in a vertical merger, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. 




122 For a defense of Apple’s in-app payments Rule 3.1.1, see Apple’s 
Opposition to Epic’s Motion for a TRO/PI, Epic Games, Inc., v. Apple Inc., 
No. 3:20-cv-05640-YGR, at 21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020), https://cdn.vox-
cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/21807196/file0.58943333434048.pdf 
[hereinafter Apple’s Opposition] (“Epic’s claim also depends on holding that 
Apple’s App Store requirements—which ensure security, privacy and a 
quality user experience—are a “tie,” monopoly maintenance and a violation 
of the rule of reason. Product and technology choices such as how Apple 
structures the App Store and its Guidelines do not constitute anticompetitive 
conduct.”); see also App Store Review Guidelines, APPLE DEVELOPER (Feb. 1, 
2021), https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines. 
123 Apple’s Opposition, supra note 122; App Store Review Guidelines, supra 
note 122.   
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III. FACEBOOK AND ITS ACQUISITION OF INSTAGRAM 
The Facebook documents focus on its acquisition of 
Instagram.124 The key question is whether the acquisition squashed an 
emerging competitor or instead gave Instagram the resources necessary 
to succeed.125 Email messages between Kevin Systrom and Mark 
Zuckerberg, chat messages between Kevin Systrom and Matt Cohler, 
internal communications between Mark Zuckerberg and David 
Ebersman, and corporate communications by Sheryl Sandberg reveal 
the inside story of how each company came to agree to the business 
combination.126 
Instagram grew rapidly in its first two years, which impressed 
Facebook executives. Mark Zuckerberg identified the company as 
Facebook’s biggest threat.127 But Zuckerberg also noted that, “one 
thing about startups though is that you can often acquire them.”128 
Facebook needed to decide if they were “friends or foes.”129 
 
124 Facebook documents from the Hearing on Online Platforms and Market 
Power: Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Comm., and 
Admin. Law, 116th Cong. 2 (2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/online-
platforms-and-market-power/#3 [hereinafter Hearing Documents 
(Facebook)]. 
125 Id.; see also Hearing Video, supra note 2 (statement by Jerrold Nadler, 
Representative, New York at 01:01:39, characterizing the acquisition of 
Instagram by Facebook as “exactly the kind of anticompetitive acquisition that 
the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.”). 
126 Hearing Documents (Facebook), supra note 124; see also Hearing Video, 
supra note 2 (statement by Jerrold Nadler, Representative, New York at 
01:01:39). 
127 E-mail from Mark Zuckerberg, Chief Exec. Officer, Facebook Inc. (Apr. 
9, 2012), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0006334000063341.pdf. 
128 Id.; see also Hearing Video, supra note 2 (question by Jerrold Nadler, 
Representative, New York at 01:02:05, quoting Mark Zuckerberg’s email and 
Mark Zuckerberg’s response, “in the growing space around—after smart 
phones started getting big, they competed with us in the space of mobile 
cameras and mobile photo sharing, but, at the time, almost no one thought of 
them as a general social network, and people didn’t think of them as competing 
with us in that space, and I think the acquisition has been wildly successful. 
We were able to, by acquiring them, to continue investing in it and growing it 
as a standalone brand that now reaches many more people than I think Kevin, 
the founder at the time, or I, thought to be possible at the time while also 
incorporating the technology to making Facebook’s photo sharing products 
better.”). 
129 Hearing Documents (Facebook), supra note 124, at Ex. C, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0008.pdf.  
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Facebook’s assessment of the smaller firm included considerations, 
such as strategic position.130 One executive expressed the sentiment 
that “not losing strategic position in photos is worth a lot of money.”131  
 
Figure 5. Facebook.com in March 2012 
Emails between Kevin Systrom of Instagram and Zuckerberg 
showed Systrom’s initial reluctance to sell, and Zuckerberg’s efforts to 
persuade Systrom to sell.132 Zuckerberg’s emails described his view on 
the inevitability of a relationship between the two companies.133  
In a lengthy email discussion of the social media market, the 
growth of Instagram, and the benefits of joining Facebook, Zuckerberg 
and Systrom laid out the terms of the acquisition.134 Systrom set an 
initial value of Instagram at $500 million, then changed his offer to $2 
 
130 Id.; see also Hearing Video, supra note 2 (question by Jerrold Nadler, 
Representative, New York at 01:04:00, quoting Mark Zuckerberg’s email and 
Mark Zuckerberg’s response, “in the space of mobile photos and camera apps, 
which was growing, they were a competitor.”). 
131 E-mail from Mike Schroepfer, Vice President of Eng’g, Apple Inc., to Mark 
Zuckerberg, Chief Exec. Officer, Facebook Inc. (Mar. 9, 2012), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0006318000063197.pdf. 
132 E-mails between Mark Zuckerberg, Chief Exec. Officer, Facebook Inc., 
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billion.135 Zuckerberg would eventually work out a deal for $1 
billion.136 In the course of negotiations, Zuckerberg wrote,  
“Of course, at the same time we’re developing our own 
photos strategy, so how we engage now will also 
determine how much we’re partners vs competitors 
down the line -- and I’d like to make sure we decide 
that thoughtfully as well.”137  
This conversation on whether to join forces or remain independent with 
estimates on its value varying from $500 million to $2 billion from one 
day to the next shows how uncertain Instagram’s future was at the time.  
 
Figure 6. Instagram.com in March 2012 
The deal between Zuckerberg and Systrom included terms 
familiar to many in Silicon Valley. They discussed the terms of the 
deal: 
“Most of the upfront deal consideration portion for 
you guys also needs to vest in addition to the retention 
package. It will have the same provisions of double-
trigger etc [sic] to guarantee you eventually get it, but 
we can’t just transfer all of the money immediately. 




137 E-mails between Mark Zuckerberg and Kevin Systrom, supra note 132.  
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other deals you’ve done, but I just wanted to clear this 
up since I think I misspoke on it.”138  
Internal emails between Zuckerberg and David Ebersman, Facebook’s 
counsel, show the deliberations that occurred within Facebook at the 
time of these negotiations. Zuckerberg describes possible reasons for 
an acquisition to “neutralize competition” and to “integrate their 
products.”139 “What we’re really buying is time,” writes Zuckerberg, 
as there are a “finite number of different social mechanics to invent.”140 
Purchasing a company like Instagram, FourSquare, or Path would 
allow Facebook to integrate their mechanics at scale, increasing 
barriers to entry for other startups.141 Zuckerberg reasoned that “the 
businesses are nascent but the networks are established, the brands are 
already meaningful and if they grow to a large scale they could be very 
disruptive to us.”142  
In a follow-up email, however, Zuckerberg backtracked with 
Ebersman that he “didn’t mean to imply that we’re buying them to 
prevent them from competing with us in any way.”143 He stated 
procompetitive reasons that motivated his interest in Instagram, “I’m 
mostly excited about what the companies could do together if we 
worked to build what they’ve invented into more people’s 
experiences.”144 
Zuckerberg’s comment reveals the tension between finding 
economic conduct that hurts nascent competition rather than improving 
 
138 Id. 
139 E-mail from Mark Zuckerberg, Chief Exec. Officer, Facebook Inc., to 
David Ebersman, Counsel, Facebook Inc. (Feb. 27, 2012), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0006322000063223.pdf.  
140 Id. 
141 Id.; see also Hearing Video, supra note 2 (question by Jerrold Nadler, 
Representative, New York at 01:06:04, and Mark Zuckerberg’s response: 
“The FTC had all these documents and at the time unanimously voted at the 
time not to challenge the acquisition…at the time it was far from obvious. A 
lot of the competitors that they competed with in mobile sharing, including 
companies such as Path which were hot at the time with great founders. I don’t 
think Path exists today. It was not a guarantee that Instagram was going to 
succeed. The acquisition has done wildly well, largely because, not just 
because of the founder’s talent but because we invested heavily in building up 
the infrastructure, promoting it, and working on security and working on a lot 
of things around this, I think this has been an American success story.”). 
142 E-mail from Mark Zuckerberg to David Ebersman, supra note 139. 
143 Id. 
144 Id.  
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fledgling products and enhancing consumer welfare through better 
distribution. While his followup email has the tone of someone who 
just sat through a lecture from his general counsel about the dangers of 
email, other evidence suggests Facebook believed that it faced real 
weaknesses that it had to address. 
In 2011, a presentation by Sheryl Sandberg showed that 
Facebook owned 95 percent of social media usage in the U.S.145 
However, the slides also showed Facebook’s weakness in mobile and 
desire to grow in mobile, emphasized by Facebook’s partnership with 
Vodafone.146 Facebook executives expressed their concern at losing 
market position and advocated to aggressively move into the mobile 
space.147 An email read, “I hate the word ‘land grab’ but I think that is 
the best convincing argument and we should own that.”148 
In 2014, board meeting minutes showed Sheryl Sandberg’s 
concern that the high concentration of the smartphone market between 
Apple and Google “poses a significant strategic threat to the 
Company’s business”149 and that another mobile app would increase 
Facebook’s hold in the mobile market. Sandberg remarked, “high 
concentration of the mobile operating system market . . . poses a 
significant strategic threat to the business.”150 
These presentations by Sandberg over the span of several years 
suggest that Facebook was threatened by growth in the mobile market 
for social media. Strategic partnerships with Vodafone and with mobile 
OS systems by Apple and Google were all part of the set of options by 
Facebook to stay competitive in the rapidly changing ecosystem that 
migrated from primarily desktop to mobile usage. 
The question facing antitrust investigators will be whether the 
rhetoric reflects a view by Facebook that it was dominant and needed 
to squash any emerging competitors,151 or whether it saw a potentially 
 
145 Sheryl Sandberg, Chief Operating Officer, Facebook Inc., Facebook 




148 Hearing Documents (Facebook), supra note 124, at Ex. B, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0005.pdf. 
149 Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of Facebook, Inc. 2 (Feb. 
14, 2014), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0004537600045378.pdf.  
150 Id. 
151 See Hearing Video, supra note 2 (statement by Pramila Jayapar, 
Representative, Washington at 02:47:40, asserting that Facebook engaged in 
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fatal weakness in its own business model and moved to address it as a 
matter of survival. The former could represent an antitrust violation 
while the latter could be an example of Facebook applying its scale to 
keep up with emerging trends.152 
IV. GOOGLE 
The Google documents focus on its acquisition of YouTube 
beginning in 2006, the development of strategy around vertical search 
in 2006 and 2007, and issues surrounding the Chrome web browser in 
2011.153 These documents are particularly difficult to contextualize 
given that they focus on events that occurred relatively long ago. 
Google’s market capitalization then was 20 percent of what it is now 
and it ranked 27th on the list of largest public companies by market 
cap.154 
A. The YouTube Acquisition 
After initial evaluations of YouTube in 2006, one Google 
executive wrote, “YouTube’s value to us would be a smart team and a 
platform we could build from,”155 saying later, “I want to be aggressive 
about deals that make Google the default place to store photos and 
videos.”155 Other correspondence downplayed YouTube’s value, 
 
anticompetitive conduct as a monopoly by threatening competitors and 
copying features); id. (statement by Val Demings, Representative, Florida at 
03:50:20, characterizing internal deliberations by Facebook’s product 
managers on platform access to Pinterest and Netflix in 2014 as an effort to 
“weaponize” its platform policy and enforcing it selectively to undermine 
competitors). 
152 Id. (questions by Pramila Jayapar, Representative, Washington at 02:44:40, 
for Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s efforts to copy and clone features as 
trends changed, and Mark Zuckerberg’s response with examples of successful 
and unsuccessful features developed by Facebook that were simultaneously 
being developed by smaller startups at the time).  
153 Google documents from the Hearing on Online Platforms and Market 
Power: Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Comm., and 
Admin. Law, 116th Cong. 2 (2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/online-
platforms-and-market-power/#4 [hereinafter Hearing Documents (Google)]. 
154 Alphabet Market Cap 2006-2020, MACROTRENDS, 
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/GOOGL/alphabet/market-cap 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2021). 
155 E-mail from Salar Kamangar, Senior Vice President, Google, to Jeff Huber, 
Senior Vice President, Google (Feb. 1, 2006), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/04189233.pdf. 
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however. A Google executive noted that YouTube’s talent, systems, 
and content quality would not be particularly valuable to Google, even 
though YouTube recently turned down another $500 million 
acquisition offer.156 Instead, rather “if we pick them up it would be 
defensive vs yahoo.”157 Similarly, Eric Schmidt seemed more inclined 
to acquire the talent and leadership team rather than the company. Upon 
YouTube’s rejection of Google’s initial $200 million offer, he wrote, 
“please do figure out a way for us to help them achieve their vision. 
We won’t be pursuing them as an acquisition.”158  
Again, rhetoric alone proves little. Negotiations regarding the 
acquisition reveal the uncertainty regarding YouTube’s value. 
Business documents show that the estimated value of the company 
varied from a lower bound offer of $200 million to the final 2006 sale 
price of $1.65 billion.159  
An antitrust investigation of Google’s acquisition of YouTube 
would need to incorporate the economics of start-up valuation.160 Did 
Google pay too little at $1.65 billion for YouTube?161 Did the YouTube 
 
156 E-mail from Susan Wojcicki, Senior Vice President of Advertising & 
Commerce, Google, to Jonathan Rosenberg, Senior Vice President, Google 
(May 1, 2006), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/04189266.pdf. 
157 Id. 
158 E-mail from Eric Schmidt, Chief Exec. Officer, Google, to Sean Dempsey, 
Principal Corp. Dev., Google (Feb. 13, 2006), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/04189250.pdf. 
159 Id. 
160 At the time of the acquisition, the Federal Trade Commission issued an 
early termination notice, which indicated that the agency and the U.S. 
Department of Justice reviewed the $1.65 billion proposed merger and 
declined to take further action. See 20070088: Google Inc.; YouTube, Inc., 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, EARLY TERMINATION NOTICES, PREMERGER 
NOTIFICATION PROGRAM (Nov. 2, 2006), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/early-
termination-notices/20070088; see generally Greg Sandoval, Schmidt: We 
Paid $1 Billion Premium for YouTube, CNET (Oct. 6, 2009), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/schmidt-we-paid-1-billion-premium-for-youtube 
(“Since 2006, many observers have scratched their head over what prompted 
Google to pay $1.65 billion for the video site YouTube. We're now a little 
closer to the answer.”). 
161 A balanced research study should include the full set of acquisition targets 
that were completed and rejected, with counterfactual analysis of how the 
small firms would have fared with or without acquisition. See generally 
Hearing Video, supra note 2 (question by Mary Gay Scanlon, Representative, 
Pennsylvania at 03:58:55 for Sudhar Pichai about the disparity between the 
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creators underestimate the value of their company and accept too low 
a price? A court should also want to know how Google’s acquisition 
affected innovation on video streaming and what a counterfactual 
world in which YouTube was not acquired would look like.162 Given 
that 14 years have gone by, it is difficult to imagine designing a 
counterfactual that would carry much weight in an argument.  
 
Figure 7. YouTube.com in September 2006 
B. Vertical Search  
Documents from 2006 and 2007 show Google’s internal 
strategy development around vertical search and its importance to 
Google’s growth in the effort to make Google a global leader in 
search.163 In 2005, Google was developing a strategy around vertical 
 
first bid and final acquisition price of $1.65 billion for YouTube which was 
nearly 30 times the initial bid of $50 million).  
162 See Overview of the Merger Retrospective Program in the Bureau of 
Economics, FED. TRADE COMM’N: MERGER RETROSPECTIVE PROGRAM, 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/merger-retrospectives/overview 
(describing the agency’s effort to evaluate its internal analytical tools and 
models in premerger notification reviews by comparing predicted results with 
actual results and measuring the efficacy of analytical thresholds and 
empirical methods used by antitrust economists to predict merger effects and 
counterfactual scenarios). 
163 E-mail from Bill Brougher, Product Manager, Google, to Ben Gomes, Vice 
President of Search, Google, Ramanathan Guha, Google Fellow, Google, and 
Amit Singhai, Head of Search, Google (Nov. 29, 2005), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/04137557.pdf. 
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search that would influence the search engine’s growth for the next 15 
years.164 
A strategy document noted that “the growth of sites like 
MySpace and YouTube puts the search business in jeopardy.”165 To 
account for these threats, the strategy document advises that Google, 
“need[s] to own the search box on the entertainment 
sites, we need to be the search site where you can find 
entertainment content, we need to succeed in social 
networking, and we need to build better entertainment 
and social interaction into our search experience.”166  
Google should “[t]urn having the largest user base into an unfair 
advantage by building out technology that improves linearly with base 
size.”167 According to the document, in order to prevent MySpace from 
becoming the default social search function, “Google should host all 
information about a person, including MySpace [sic] info.”168 
 
Figure 8. Google.com in July 2006 
Internal emails showed employees expressing concern that 
third-party sellers were putting Google at risk of disintermediation, 
providing the company with less data and less revenue.169 A report 
 
164 Id. 
165 Internal Memorandum from the Google Search Team 1 (2006), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/01099367.pdf. 
166 Id. at 5. 
167 Id. at 1.  
168 Id. at 9. 
169 Hearing Documents (Google), supra note 153. 
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noted the threat of “proliferating verticals,”170 and mandated that 
Google execute on its verticals so as not to give ground to competition. 
The company was “[d]riv[ing] too much traffic to competitors monster 
[sic] and hotjobs [sic].”171  
A letter from the founder of a website called Celebrity Net 
Worth expressed outrage at Google’s control over search to favor its 
own verticals. The founder wrote, 
“If someone came to me with an idea for a website or 
a web service today, I would tell them to run. Run as 
far away from the web as possible. Launch a lawn care 
business or a dog grooming business – something 
Google can’t take away as soon as he or she is 
thriving.”172  
This series of documents reveal, at most, evolving views on the 
business strategy of building a general search engine or vertical search 
categories. They show some Google people worrying about the future 
of their business and a competitor upset that Google’s new business 
plans make it more difficult for companies, like Celebrity Net Worth, 
with very specialized searches to succeed. 
 
170 Hearing Documents (Google), supra note 153, at Ex. A, 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0001.pdf; see also Hearing Video, 
supra note 2 (question by David Cicilline, Representative, Rhode Island at 
00:51:45, regarding Google’s fear of competitors in vertical search and the 
“proliferating threat” of certain websites getting “too much traffic,” with 
response from Sudhar Pichai that “when we look at vertical searches, it 
validates the competition we see...”). 
171 Hearing Documents (Google), supra note 153, at Ex. A.  
172 Id.  
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Figure 9. MySpace in April 2005 
 
Figure 10. Yahoo! Hotjobs in July 2006 
The internal debate about general and vertical search in 2006 
may seem quaint today in 2020. Google is a general search engine that 
generates results on an enormous number of vertical categories. From 
the user’s perspective, Google’s search engine delivers the results that 
fit the user’s request—if the user enters a general query, the results 
offered are general. If the user enters a specific query, the results 
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offered are specialized to a vertical category such as travel or 
shopping.173  
As with YouTube, this controversy happened so long ago it is 
difficult to draw conclusions regarding today’s market. Still, the 
general approach to looking for anticompetitive behavior would be 
similar. The first step would be to define the relevant market.174 In this 
case, one question might be whether the relevant market includes 
search engines such as Edge and DuckDuckGo or vertical search sites 
such as Yelp and Expedia. An investigation would also have to define 
general and vertical search in a precise way that may not be so easy 
today.175 
With those definitions, a key set of questions would be whether 
Google foreclosed competition from competing vertical search engines 
by giving preference to its own vertical category and whether that self-
preference harmed consumers.176 Celebrity Net Worth could have 
argued that it harmed consumers, but Google could counter that anyone 
seeking to learn a celebrity’s net worth would prefer to type it into 
 
173 See, e.g., Hearing Video, supra note 2 (response from Sudhar Pichai to 
question from David Cicilline, Representative, Rhode Island at 00:51:45, with 
the statement that “we see vigorous competition in [vertical categories such 
as] travel and real estate…”).  
174 See generally Markets, FED. TRADE COMM’N: GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS 
MERGERS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/mergers/markets (describing the product dimension and 
geographic dimension of market analysis in premerger notification review). 
175 On the challenge of defining vertical and general search in a dynamic 
market, see generally Joshua Gans, Google, Yelp, and the Future of Search, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 10, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/07/google-yelp-and-
the-future-of-search. For an explanation of vertical search from the 
perspective of a vertical search competitor, see Memorandum from Jeremy 
Stoppelman, Cofounder and CEO, Yelp! Inc. to the U.S. Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights 
(Sept. 21, 2011), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/11-9-
21StoppelmanTestimony.pdf. 
176 See generally, Hearing Video, supra note 2 (allegation by David Cicilline, 
Representative, Rhode Island at 00:54:34, claiming that Google is 
“increasingly a walled garden keeping users on Google’s sites.”). For an 
explanation of the theory of foreclosure through self-preferencing, see 
Michael Luca et al., Is Google Degrading Search? Consumer Harm from 
Universal Search (Berkeley Law Sch., Working Paper), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Luca-Wu-Yelp-
Is-Google-Degrading-Search-2015.pdf. 
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Google than to conduct a general search for a site that specializes in 
celebrity net worth and then click to that site to ask the specific query.   
C. Default Search and the Chrome Browser 
One email from 2011 shows Google’s desire for Chrome to 
become the default web browser on Dell computers with the default 
homepage set to Google.com.177 The email included several strategic 
goals, including installing the Google Toolbar if Internet Explorer was 
also pre-loaded.178 In an internal email, Google executives noted the 
U.S. Department of Justice’s rules on whether personal computers can 
be shipped with or without browsers pre-loaded.179 
Another email shows that Google pushed for Google.com to 
be the default browser homepage on AT&T devices.180 The att.net 
portal at the time was powered by Yahoo! search, but the Google team 
pushed for their contract to require that Android devices have either 
att.net powered by Google or directed to Google.com.181 
There is no doubt Google was trying to reach a deal for 
something it saw as beneficial to its business. Companies frequently 
disagree with each other as competitors and partners. The failure to 
agree or complaints by one side do not necessarily indicate any antitrust 
harm. Context in 2011 matters, as well. At the time, Chrome was the 
third most popular desktop browser, behind Internet Explorer and 
Firefox.182  
 
177 E-mail from Jim Kolotouros, Vice President, Android Platform 
Partnerships, Google, to Jim Holden, Senior Director of Strategic 
Partnerships, Google, Joan Braddi, Vice President of Partnerships, Google 
(Feb. 18, 2011), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/00013117.pdf. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 E-mail from Ornella Indonie, Vice President Global Devices and 
Services, Google, to Philipp Schindler, Senior Vice President and Chief 
Business Officer Global Sales and Operations, Google, Joan Braddi Vice 
President of Partnerships, Google (June 20, 2015), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/04297908.pdf. 
181 Id. 
182 Desktop Browser Market Share Worldwide, GLOBALSTATS: 
STATCOUNTER, https://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-
share/desktop/worldwide/2011 (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).  
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Figure 11. att.net powered by Yahoo! in June 2015 
Whether these actions were anticompetitive or an abuse of 
market power depends on a number of questions, including what other 
options Dell and AT&T had for default search engines to display on 
their homepages and the costs, if any, that Google could impose on 
those companies for failing to reach an agreement.183 
CONCLUSION 
In the documents released by the House Judiciary Committee 
on July 29, 2020, many pages of internal emails reveal the process by 
which business executives evaluated and assessed competitors, 
changing markets, and the development of consumer products and 
services, much of which occurred in the years of 2006–2012. These 
“hot docs” provide interesting insights into some of the inner workings 
of companies, but on their own prove little.  
Depending on one’s prior beliefs about these companies, the 
documents either show intensely competitive firms operating in ways 
that society desires to increase productivity and economic growth, or 
firms determined to foreclose markets and forestall competition. 
Understanding whether firms behaved anticompetitively requires more 
 
183 See generally Robert A. Guth & Kevin J. Delaney, Pressuring Microsoft, 
PC Makers Team Up With Its Software Rivals, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2006), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113928066242466882 (“Under the deal 
being discussed, Google, of Mountain View, Calif., could pay Dell fees 
approaching $1 billion over three years, these people estimate. The terms 
might change and the discussions could fail. Any agreement would be the 
latest in a series of similar deals with computer manufacturers the giant 
Internet search company has signed.”). 
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fact-finding by parties in private litigation and investigations brought 
by the Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Department of Justice, and 
state attorney generals.  
